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Constitutional Dynamics and Partisan Conflict:  
 
A Comparative Assessment of Multi-level Systems in Europe 
 
 
 
Nicole Bolleyer (University of Exeter), Wilfried Swenden and Nicola McEwen (University of 
Edinburgh) 
 
Abstract: The case studies revealed that the constitutional nature of a multi-level system 
indeed shapes its modes of day-to-day intergovernmental coordination and, with it, the way 
competences are (re)allocated in the longer term. Both in federal arrangements and in 
confederations, the ‘subunits’ – whose status is constitutionally protected - could more easily 
defend their decision-making capacity within their areas of jurisdiction because they can veto 
changes in the allocation of competencies, an advantage lower-level governments in 
regionalized systems do not enjoy. Similarly, in federal and confederal systems day-to-day 
interaction in IGR predominantly took place in multilateral structures, while in regionalized 
systems bilateralism was more pronounced. The relative influence of party-political 
(in)congruence on IGR, in contrast, was more varied than theoretically expected.  
 
Keywords: Multi-level systems, comparative federalism, institutionalism, party-political conflict, 
intergovernmental relations 
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1. Classical Institutionalism and the Study of Multi-level Systems 
 
In this special issue we have sought to bring ‘classic institutionalism’ back into the study of 
multi-level systems. By focusing on the constitutional frameworks that distinguish these 
systems and by assessing their impact on intergovernmental dynamics, we distinguish 
ourselves from more recent ‘neo-institutionalist’ approaches. Unlike classical 
institutionalism, neo-institutionalism tends to built on broader conceptions of ‘institution’ 
covering not only formal-legal structures, but also institutionally embedded norms and 
perceptions (Peters, 1999). We also take a distinctive approach from approaches of ‘multi-
level governance’ which in its study of intergovernmental dynamics and policy outcomes 
emphasises a wide range of factors such as fiscal and economic resources, policy 
communities, policy networks or political leadership. In various combinations, these 
resources can indeed help governments to undercut constitutional patterns of authority and 
‘work around’ a formal shadow of hierarchy (e.g. Rhodes, 1996; 2007; Bache and Flinders, 
2004; Piattoni, 2010).  
 With the proliferation of these approaches, however, the question of how much of 
multi-level dynamics can be understood through a classic-institutionalist lens is rarely asked. 
In this special issue we have sought to reconnect with classic institutionalism by drawing 
from a scenario rooted in studies of ‘comparative federalism’. Using federalism, 
confederalism and regionalism as distinctive constitutional categories of multi-level 
government, we examined the extent to which the constitutional make-up of the polity 
generates different dynamics with regard to three dependent variables: (1) the nature of 
intergovernmental relations, (2) the longer tem constitutional evolution of the multi-level 
system in terms of competence re-allocation and (3) the relative impact of party political 
incongruence across central and lower-level governments on those coordination processes 
respectively.  
 
The constitutionally defined categories of federalism, confederalism and regionalism rest on 
two basic distinctions derived from the comparative federalism literature (Elazar, 1993; 
Sbragia, 1993; Watts, 1998; 1999). These are first, whether or not lower-level governments in 
a multi-level system enjoy constitutional protection (irrespective of the centre’s position) and 
second, whether or not there is a constitutional hierarchy inherent in the system (irrespective 
of whether the centre or the lower tier is constitutionally superior). Confederations have a 
weak and, in principle, subordinate centre. In federations the centre and sub-units share 
3 
 
sovereignty since both have a constitutionally protected status and cannot be unilaterally 
disempowered by the other tier of government. As a result, the ‘subunits’ can more easily 
defend their decision-making capacity within their areas of jurisdiction because they can veto 
changes in the allocation of competencies, an advantage lower-level governments in 
regionalized systems do not enjoy. In contrast, in regionalized systems, the centre – 
constitutionally speaking - has the final say, notwithstanding the presence of lower tiers of 
government with legislative powers (that might or might not be constitutionally entrenched).i 
 To examine a set of hypotheses derived from these two distinctions, we selected seven 
cases of multi-level political systems in Europe spanning the confederal-federal-regionalized 
divide. The UK and Italy qualify as regionalized systems, Germany, Switzerland, Spain and 
Finland’s arrangement with the Åland Islands qualify as federal. The EU which (despite the 
possibility of making decisions with qualified majority in the Council of Ministers) still 
requires unanimity to reallocate competences qualifies as confederal. As our comparative 
summary below illustrates, in line with our theoretical expectations, the findings in this 
special issue suggest that these different constitutional types of multi-level government 
exercise an enduring effect on day-to-day intergovernmental dynamics as well as on how 
competence allocation evolves over time. Furthermore, these varieties of multi-level 
government also affect the relative impact of party political incongruence across central and 
lower-level governments on intergovernmental coordination processes.  
In the remainder of this conclusion, we summarize what each of these seven case studies tells 
us about the hypothesized relationships between these constitutional types of multi-level 
government and intergovernmental dynamics and the role of party-political (in)congruence in 
them. Before systematically comparing the case studies, we first recapture the essence of the 
assumed relationships between constitutional types of multi-level government and 
intergovernmental relations as derived from our ‘comparative federalism scenario’.  
 
2. Constitution Categories of Multi-level Systems and their Implications for Inter-
governmental Dynamics 
Briefly summing up our theoretical framework and starting with the dimension expected to 
shape the nature of intergovernmental coordination (both in terms of day-to-day processes 
and competence allocation), confederations and federal systems are similar in giving the 
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lower-level governments (member-states or sub-national units) constitutionally entrenched 
policy autonomy and a direct say in competence (re)allocation. As a reflection of this equal, 
constitutionally guaranteed status, we expected lower-level governments in confederations 
and federal systems to be more likely to engage in multilateral structures of coordination, 
both horizontally and vertically, than lower-level governments in regionalized regimes where 
the latter remain more directly dependent on the goodwill of the centre (H1). To compensate 
for their weaker constitutional status, we suggested each unit in a regionalized system will try 
to use whatever resources it has to get a good deal from the centre bilaterally, which implies 
that other factors should come into play to shape the nature of coordination, including 
cultural identity, population size or relative economic strength of the individual government 
unit. In the long run this behaviour on behalf of lower-level units was expected to reinforce 
the asymmetrical competence distribution in the system, while in confederate and federal 
systems intergovernmental dynamics are conducive to perpetuating a symmetric 
(re)allocation of competencies, since each government is in a constitutionally equally strong 
position to guard its autonomy, a rationale that underpins our second hypothesis (H2).  
Next to the constitutional status of lower-level governments as one important dimension 
along which to distinguish multi-level systems, we expected the presence or absence of a 
constitutional hierarchy (with either the centre or the lower-level units as the dominant part), 
to shape the relative forcefulness with which partisan difference feeds into intergovernmental 
dynamics. In multi-level polities with a shadow of hierarchy (confederal or regionalized 
arrangements), the implicit threat that conflicts may lead to a unilateral withdrawal of 
competences initiated by the dominant level may motivate the constitutionally weaker units 
to opt for an overall cooperative strategy in which partisan differences are downplayed. By 
contrast, in federal systems, the absence of constitutional hierarchy implies that in periods of 
incongruence partisan differences fully feed into the system because neither level has to fear 
that a clash might threaten its basic constitutional status (H3).  
Table 1 links our theoretical expectations to the seven case studies. The darker shadings in 
each of the three right-hand columns indicate which cases we expected to resemble each 
other with regard to each of the three hypotheses. The constitutional equality of lower-level 
units (regions) in federal and (states in) confederal systems was expected to favour the 
creation and usage of multilateral intergovernmental institutions, in which the participating 
governments are formally embedded as equal partners. This, in turn, was expected to produce 
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a tendency towards multilateral agreements and, in the longer run, to generate the 
symmetrical (re)allocation of competencies. Following our classification of cases in the 
introduction, we would expect such tendencies to characterize the European multi-level 
system as whole (a confederation) as well as dynamics in the four federal systems. In Italy 
and the UK, which are regionalized systems, tendencies towards bilateralism and asymmetry 
in competence allocation should prevail.  
Table 1: Expected Dynamics in European Multi-level Systems  
Type of 
Constitutional 
Regime 
Cases Expected Nature of 
Coordination (H1) 
Expected Pattern of 
Constitutional Change 
(H2) 
Expected Impact of Party 
(In)congruence (H3) 
 
Confederal 
Arrangement 
European Union Multilateralism dominates 
over bilateralism/ 
differentiated coordination 
Symmetrical competence 
(re)allocation 
Role of party 
(in)congruence limited 
Federal 
Arrangement  
 
Switzerland 
Germany 
Spain 
Finland/Åland  
Multilateralism dominates 
over bilateralism/ 
differentiated coordination 
 
Symmetrical competence 
(re)allocation 
Intergovernmental 
conflict if incongruence/ 
integration if congruence  
Regionalized 
Arrangement 
UK 
Italy 
Bilateralism/differentiated 
coordination dominates 
over multilateralism 
Asymmetrical 
competence 
(re)allocation 
Role of party 
(in)congruence limited 
Notes: Same shadings imply same outcomes expected in respective categories. 
As far as the relative impact of party-political (in)congruence in intergovernmental processes 
is concerned (either as a moderating factor if governments are congruent or as conflict-
enhancing during periods of incongruence), the four cases in the federal category should be 
affected by this factor more strongly than either of our regionalized cases (the UK and Italy) 
or the European Union. 
3. Multi-level Dynamics in Europe: The Analysis of Seven Case Studies 
Table 2 provides an overview of the findings of the seven case studies. Mirroring Table 1, it 
displays the basic tendencies along the three hypotheses, providing significant 
considerablesupport for our ‘comparative federalism scenario’. Levels of party-political 
(in)congruence between the governments constituting a multi-level system can vary over time 
and we expect opposite effects – integration or conflict – depending on whether congruence 
or incongruence dominates. Therefore, Table 2 only gives information on the dominant 
picture for Hypothesis 3. Doing justice to the complexity of multi-level dynamics as 
displayed in the case studies, we further added a column displaying alternative factors that 
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also shape the dependent variables and in some cases such as the EU or Åland do so more 
strongly than the type of constitutional arrangement. 
The overall patterns displayed in Table 2 confirm our basic expectations as derived from our 
three constitutional categories in most of the case studies, especially regarding H1 and H2 
which refer to intergovernmental (short-and long-term) dynamics and the dynamics of 
competence (re)allocation. The findings only partially confirm the relative impact of party-
political (in)congruence. We find two main sources that lead to empirical deviations from our 
theoretical expectations. Deviations emerge when certain fundamental preconditions for the 
applicability of our hypotheses are not met as in the cases of Åland and the EU (in both 
multi-level systems basic party linkages across governments operating on the same or distinct 
levels are absent; rendering party (in)congruence as a variable obsolete. Deviations also 
emerge where case-specific factors are more important to the intergovernmental dynamics 
than the factors identified by our framework, as is the case for Switzerland. In Switzerland, 
multi-level dynamics have been shaped more by the widespread occurrence of direct 
democracy than by party incongruence (Linder, 1994). Being case-specific, mechanisms of 
direct democracy fall outside the scope of our constitutional categories which have been kept 
deliberately abstract to be able to ‘travel across cases and context.  
To systematically evaluate our ‘comparative federalism scenario’ and the constitutional 
categories from which it derives its hypotheses, the following sections will comparatively 
assess first H1 and H2 (II.1) and then H3 (II.2) in light of the findings of the seven case 
studies. On that basis, we then discuss factors important to our dependent variables outside of 
our framework (II.3). 
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Table 2: Multi-level Dynamics in Seven European Multi-level Systems 
 
 
 
Regime Type 
 
 
Case 
 
Nature of Intergovernmental 
Institutions/Dominant 
Coordination Mode: 
Bilateralism vs. 
Multilateralism   (H1) 
Nature of Constitutional Change: 
Symmetry or Asymmetry of 
Formal Competence 
(Re)allocation         
(H2) 
Dominant Trend in Party 
(In)congruence 
Impact Party (In)congruence 
on IGR:  
Conflict if Incongruence/ 
Integration if Congruence  
(H3)  
Alternative Factors Shaping IGR 
Confederal 
Arrangement 
European 
Union 
Multilateralism Symmetry (horizontally) Preconditions for 
In(congruence) not met 
(lack of party linkages) 
- -Territorial interests/conflict 
-Origin as international organisation* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal 
Arrangement  
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
------------------- 
Finland/ Åland 
 
(federacy) 
 
Multilateralism 
 
 
 
Multilateralism 
 
 
Multilateralism 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Preconditions for 
Multilateralism not met  
(only one devolved unit) 
 
Symmetry (horizontally) 
 
 
 
Symmetry (horizontally) 
 
 
Symmetry (horizontally) 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Preconditions for Horizontal 
Symmetry not met  
(only one devolved unit) 
  
 
Long-term Congruence 
 
 
 
Periodic Incongruence 
 
 
Periodic Incongruence 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Preconditions for 
In(congruence) not met 
(lack of party linkages) 
 
Weak Integrative Effect 
 
 
 
Intense Conflict Potential 
 
 
Intense Conflict Potential 
 
 
------------------------------ 
- 
 
-Inter-party cooperation invited by 
direct democratic mechanisms* 
-Territorial interests/conflict 
 
-Territorial interests/conflict 
 
 
-Inter-party cooperation/ coalition 
formation, strong regionalist parties 
- Lack of shared rule at centre 
----------------------------------------- 
-Territorial interests/conflict 
-Finish-Swedish language 
barrier/geographical distance/small 
size* 
-Lack of shared rule at centre 
 
 
 
Regionalized 
Arrangement 
 
UK 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
Bilateralism 
 
 
 
 
Bilateralism 
 
Asymmetry (horizontally) 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetry (horizontally) 
 
Periodic Incongruence 
 
 
 
 
Periodic Incongruence 
 
Limited Conflict Potential 
 
 
 
 
Limited Conflict Potential 
 
 
- Inter-party cooperation/ coalition 
formation, strong regionalist parties 
-Territorial interests/conflict 
- Lack of shared rule at centre 
 
- Inter-party cooperation/ coalition 
formation 
-Territorial interests/conflict 
Notes: Dynamics/patterns contradicting theoretical expectations in bold. * Factor shaping multilevel dynamics only in individual systems (not discussed in 3.3 on rivalling factors). 
8 
 
The Nature of Intergovernmental Dynamics: Day-to-Day Decision-making and Long-Term 
Evolution  
In line with hypotheses 1 and 2, we expected the patterns of IGR and the nature of 
competence (re)allocation to be distinct in regionalized systems as compared to 
confederations and federal systems. The case studies of Italy and the UK, our two 
regionalized arrangements, indeed reveal similarities in line with the hypotheses derived from 
our ‘comparative federalism scenario’. 
As detailed in Palermo’s and Wilson’s analysis, the Italian system developed from a highly 
unitary state into a regionalized system that, especially after the 2001 constitutional reforms 
grants regional governments significant legislative competence. The latter, however, remain 
embedded in a highly centralized bureaucratic structure in which the central level still plays a 
dominant role in policy-making. This situation is reinforced by a powerful Constitutional 
Court that – thanks to inconsistencies in the institutional design – has played a decisive role 
in the interpretation of legal provisions and tended to support a rather centralist interpretation 
of the distribution of competences. Looking at the horizontal distribution of competences in 
the Italian regionalized state, we find fifteen ordinary status regions whose policy 
competences and financial resources are symmetrical, next to five special status regions with 
distinct statutes of autonomy that are periodically revised through bilateral agreements. While 
the relations between the ordinary status regions are organized in a multilateral fashion 
reflecting the symmetry of competence allocation among them, the centre kept the final say 
on decisions affecting their competence and resource allocation. Consequently, formal 
mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination remained relatively weak. The overall 
system of multi-level government in the Italian state remains weakly integrated and weakly 
institutionalized (multilateral bodies are advisory in the main and meet infrequently), with 
bilateralism as the dominant interaction mode, reflecting the asymmetry between ordinary 
and special regions as well as between different special regions (H1). The 2001 reform 
increased the limited competences of ordinary regions, yet did not introduce a symmetrical 
allocation. Interestingly, since 2001, individual ordinary regions could request additional 
powers from the Italian parliament – a potential source of asymmetry between ordinary 
regions as much as a potential way of reducing the gap between individual ordinary regions 
and special regions. However, the Italian parliament has never granted such a transfer, 
thereby maintaining the fundamental distinction between ordinary and special regions (H2).  
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 Similar to the Italian regionalized system, the UK is characterized by a lack of strong 
multilateral intergovernmental bodies and dominated by bilateral relations, mirroring the 
asymmetrical nature of the British multi-level system. As Swenden and McEwen indicate in 
their analysis of UK devolution, the devolved regions are vulnerable to the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’. Arguably, this is mainly the result of a lack of devolved shared rule at the centre. 
Furthermore, in theory, sovereignty still rests with the UK parliament and the powers of 
devolved assemblies are derived from Westminster statute. Therefore, in constitutional terms 
they lack the entrenchment of units in a federal state (but see III for the difference between 
constitutional norm and political practice). As a consequence, in intergovernmental disputes 
the UK government has the upper hand. Next to its constitutional supremacy, it has greater 
policy capacity than each of the devolved regions and controls the resources for territorial 
finance. While multilateral bodies are not absent in UK intergovernmental relations, prior to 
2007 the Joint Ministerial Committee, the mechanism established for intergovernmental 
coordination between the UK government and the lower-level governments, was rarely used.ii 
Post 2007, when party incongruence increased following the entry of regional parties into 
devolved government in Scotland and Wales and the resumption of devolution in Northern 
Ireland, these structures became more relevant (see II.3). Bilateralism, however, remained the 
dominant mode overall and intergovernmental relations – despite the occasional assertiveness 
of the devolved administrations – particularly Scotland – remain hierarchical (H1). Because 
different autonomy arrangements apply to each of the devolved territories, the devolved 
governments use whatever resources they have to get the most out of the centre. As a result 
the long-term perpetuation of constitutional asymmetry and diversity is reinforced, which 
confirms H2 of our ‘comparative federalism scenario’.   
In sum, there are significant differences between the Italian and UK regionalized state. The 
pronounced pluri-national nature of the UK (which predates devolution) feeds the particularly 
powerful position of Scotland (which will decide on independence from the UK in a 
referendum in September 2014). There is no comparable pendant for Scotland in the Italian 
state. Nonetheless, when considering the dominant logic of these two systems, we find 
remarkable parallels in the way IGR is structured by bilateral relations dominated by the 
centre and by the asymmetrical allocation of competences that seems to be built into these 
two systems. These tendencies are unlikely to change in the longer term being rooted in the 
fundamental hierarchy that favours the central tier over the subnational level and is 
constitutive for both of these multi-level systems.  
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Although Spain is sometimes considered a regionalized rather than a federal state, the 
contrast between the two regionalized systems and the evolution of Spain’s multi-level 
system is indicative. In Spain central dominance is more constrained by the possibility of 
lower-level units to veto competence withdrawal, preventing the constitutional entrenchment 
of a central-regional imbalance. This pluri-national state – resembling in this respect the UK 
constellation more than the UK and Italy resemble each other - moved from dominant 
bilateralism towards multilateralism and from horizontal asymmetry towards symmetry, 
indicating that societal complexity does not necessarily lead to institutional asymmetry, in 
line with H2. Importantly, although Spain is often cited as an example of asymmetric 
federalism, reflecting the special constitutional status of its historical communities (in 
particular the Basque Country and Catalonia), its long term evolution has been one of 
constitutional ‘symmetrization’ (Requejo and Nagel 2012). This move to symmetrisation 
started with the Constitution of 1978 (which displayed considerable flexibility and openness 
about the nature of the devolution arrangement). However, extending regional autonomy to 
non-historic communities was contingent upon a parallel process of deepening regional self-
rule overall, a requirement to retain the consent of the historic communities with the 
constitutional evolution of the multi-level system. This increasingly symmetrical devolution 
was accompanied by the increasing institutionalization of multilateral intergovernmental 
arrangements, while maintaining the initial bilateral institutions, which are still used for 
conflict resolution but less so for day-to-day interaction (H1). Having developed into a 
federal arrangement only recently, the nature of intergovernmental relations caught up 
accordingly, in line with our framework (see for more details on Spain II.3 below). A similar 
pattern we find in Belgium, a country not covered in this special issue, which over the last 
decades evolved from a unitary system into a fully-fledged federal state. Even though the 
tensions between the two biggest lower-level governments Flanders and Wallonia gives 
bilateralism a greater weight than theoretically expected, multilateralism has gained 
increasing importance with the growing symmetrisation of competences (Beyers and 
Bursens, 2006; Poirier, 2002; Deschouwer 2009).  
In contrast to Spain and Belgium, Germany and Switzerland have been constitutionally 
federal for a much longer period. Institutionally speaking, these two federal systems tend to 
be categorized as instances of cooperative federalism, where negotiation is the dominant 
mode of interaction in the intergovernmental arena (Braun, 2000). In societal terms, however, 
they are very different. In the German federal system, the goal of equality of living conditions 
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underpins this ‘unitary federal’ system, fostering intergovernmental cooperation where it is 
constitutionally not strictly required (for instance in education). In contrast, Switzerland is a 
multi-lingual country in which local (cantonal and municipal) autonomy has traditionally 
been held high. As the case studies by Auel and by Füglister and Wasserfallen illustrated, in 
each of the two systems the federal principle is constitutive and competences cannot be 
revoked unilaterally, stressing the equality of subunits, which led to strong multilateral 
institutions as the central horizontal coordination mechanisms in IGR. They underpin regular 
ministerial meetings in the range of policy fields lower-level governments are active in, as 
well as the meetings of the peak executives: in Germany the Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz, in 
Switzerland the Konferenz of Kantonsregierungen that function as umbrella organizations 
dealing with cross-cutting policy issues. This political layer of IGR is supported by a dense 
network of officials who prepare high-level meetings as well as keep daily processes of IGR 
going. In line with H1, multilateral arrangements are strong.  
 Inevitably, these dense, cooperative networks have long-term consequences. Füglister 
and Wasserfallen stress that direct democratic mechanisms significantly add to the already 
multiple veto possibilities that slow down processes of constitutional change in the Swiss 
federal system. Yet reform processes are long-lasting and difficult in Germany (highly 
reluctant to embrace direct democracy) as well, since in both systems lower-level 
governments are in a strong position to have their voices heard and their interests considered 
in reform negotiations. The Swiss NFA reform (Neuer Finanzausgleich) was passed only in 
2004, after 15 years of intense intergovernmental negotiations requiring a high level of 
consensus (though short of unanimity)iii. It introduced considerable changes in the 
competence allocation (it included 27 constitutional amendments, more than 30 modifications 
of law, and a total revision of the fiscal equalizations system).  At the same time, in line with 
H2, the reform maintained the strong position of the cantons and the basic symmetrical 
competence allocation between them, which reflects the strength of multilateral 
intergovernmental structures, in which cantons are organized, that supported inter-cantonal 
cooperation throughout the reform negotiations.  
Attempts to reform German federalism go back to the early 1990s, yet major reform 
attempts have failed until today. A lengthy reform process eventually began in 2003 with the 
aim of reducing joint decision-making, i.e. to strengthen the federal level’s autonomous 
decision-making capacity by reducing the Länder veto on national legislation in the second 
chamber, the Bundesrat, and by transferring powers from the federal level to the Länder. The 
results of this reform were, however, disappointing. While the unitary character of German 
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federalism has been often stressed, Auel’s analysis shows that one major barrier to far-
reaching reform has been the incapacity of the Länder to form a common position in 
negotiations with the federal government, due largely to the divide between rich and poor 
Land governments. Since German Unification, the rich Länder which spoke out most in 
favour of the proposed legislative and fiscal decentralizing reforms have formed a structural 
minority in the Bundesrat. They were willing to trade Bundesrat veto rights for greater 
autonomy. The less financially well endowed Länder, by contrast, had clearly no interest in 
changing financial structures from which they profited, and changes to the fiscal constitution 
had to be taken off the agenda before negotiations even started. Nor had they much to gain 
from greater legislative autonomy, preferring to retain their federal voice through the 
Bundesrat veto right instead. The federal government, as the third player in this 
configuration, tried to gain as much freedom from Bundesrat vetoes as achievable, while 
giving up as few legislative competencies as possible in exchange. The negotiations 
inevitably ended in a weak compromise. Thus, while the federal system has become more 
asymmetric since Unification in terms of the economic and budgetary situation of the Länder 
and the party system and despite considerable reform attempts, the formal constitutional 
framework has, leaving incremental changes aside, remained the same, echoing the 
expectations of H2.  
Before moving to the next case covered in the special issue it is worthwhile to note 
that the parallels we observe in the Swiss and German case are not a result of their shared 
status as ‘cooperative federalist’ system (Braun, 2000). Taking a brief look at Australian 
federalism, a Westminster democracy with a very different political heritage, we find 
multilateralism in day-to-day interaction and constitutional negotiations to be similarly 
important. Intergovernmental processes yet again reflect the constitutionally powerful status 
of lower-level units, as visible in the central role of the Conference of Australian 
Governments (COAG) (Painter 1998; Brown 2002). 
 
While the federal systems discussed so far support H1 and H2 derived from the comparative 
federalism scenario, Finland/Åland, a federacy, stands out. The relationship between Finland 
and Åland qualifies as a federal relationship but, as typical for federacies (see also Watts 
1999; Stepan et al 2011), a basic pre-condition for multilateralism across lower-level 
governments is not given, namely the presence of multiple lower-level governments with 
substantive legislative powers with which Åland could cooperate horizontally. The 
hypotheses are therefore difficult to apply. While Finland is a unitary state with highly 
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centralized legislative competencesiv, the Åland Islands enjoy significant exclusive legislative 
competences in a range of core policy areas and thus has a unique status in the Finnish state. 
As Hepburn’s case study showed, while IGR are by definition bilateral and the competence 
allocation by definition highly asymmetrical (implying similarities with our two regionalized 
systems), the constitutional protection of Åland’s status – the core of the case’s classification 
as federal - is not without consequences, pointing to the relevance of the mechanism 
(constitutional protection of subunits) underlying H1 and H2. The island’s constitutional 
status helped to protect its autonomy by encouraging a formalized bilateral relationship with 
the centre that is not driven by the centre’s temporary priorities. This sets it apart from lower-
level governments in regionalized systems in which centre-regional interactions are more 
strongly shaped by central dominance. Åland’s representation in Finland takes the form of 
one constituency to the Finnish parliament. While the MP is expected to represent Ålandic 
interests in all Finnish affairs, influence is inevitably limited in a parliament of 200 
representatives. This, however, is no major concern of Åland’s parties which – being 
completely separate from the Finnish party system - prefer the expansion of self-rule over the 
strengthening of shared rule. The pendant to the Åland MP in Helsinki is the provincial 
Governor of Åland, appointed by the Finnish president. He is in charge of coordinating the 
relationship between Åland and the mainland, using the Åland Delegation, a joint organ 
constituted by the Autonomy Act of 1920, to resolve disputes. Despite these formal 
coordination mechanisms, however, they do not lead to a partnership between equals in 
practice. As a result of the Åland's small size, its peripheral location, which cut the islands off 
from the mainland, and the need to have conversations with the Finnish government in 
Swedish and not in Finnish, the Åland Islands have limited capacity to assure that the centre 
considers its concerns.  
 This limitation in terms of central-level access was long of little consequence for 
Åland’s autonomy, given that the latter is constitutionally enshrined and could not be 
withdrawn by the Finnish government without Åland’s explicit approval. It therefore simply 
led to each government tier to do its own thing with little interest in what the other was doing. 
However, the islands became vulnerable to ‘autonomy leakage’ – as Hepburn demonstrated 
in her article – in the course of European integration, a process that started in the 1990s and 
has by now led to considerable frictions between Åland and the Finnish government. In this 
process, competences – including those controlled by Åland - were Europeanized. While the 
Autonomy Act was amended in 2004 and 2009 to assure Åland’s participation in EU matters, 
this could not compensate for Åland’s loss in law-making competences in core areas such as 
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fisheries and the environment. The islands’ influence on the Finnish government’s position or 
direct access to EU decision-making have remained weak, a feature which the islands largely 
shared with ‘regionalized’ Italy and the UK. Thus, while Åland’s autonomy is not under 
threat to be constitutionally revoked internally, which confirms our theoretical expectations, 
its autonomy is under threat, once considering Finland as part of the multi-level system of the 
EU.  
This brings us to the EU as a supranational multi-level setting and the only 
confederation covered in this special issue. Parts of the literature have conceptualized the EU 
as a cooperative federal system (e.g. Scharpf, 1988; Börzel, 2005), given the relevance of 
joint decision-making at the EU centre (involving the direct participation of the member-
states through the Council), and the distribution of tasks between the EU centre (regulation) 
and the member-states (implementation). However, the classification of the EU as 
confederation highlights the fundamental, constitutionally defined relationship between the 
‘centre’ and ‘sub-units’as the ‘masters of the Treaty’. Taking this analytical perspective, 
compared with even the most decentralized federations, like Belgium, Canada or Switzerland, 
the EU has a much weaker centre and the member states constitute much stronger ‘sub-units’ 
(Bartolini, 2008) than the ‘cooperative-federalist analogy’ implies (Swenden, 2004; Bolleyer 
and Börzel, 2010). The status of the member states is constitutionally protected and they still 
control competence (re)allocation (i.e. can re-nationalize competences if a consensus can be 
reached on it), meeting our definition of confederation.  
 The EU’s long-term dynamics are in line with H1 and H2, despite the considerable 
increase of its internal complexity after several rounds of EU enlargement. Intuitively, one 
might argue that the high costs imposed by the highly formalized, multilateral structures in 
the EU protecting the equality of member states (in federal systems these structures have 
often no statutory basis and constrain governments less) and the ever larger number of 
member states embedded in them (increasing heterogeneity and thereby conflict) should 
generate incentives to shift towards more flexible modes of coordination as well as formal 
opt-out mechanisms, thereby weakening the multilateral nature of IGR in the EU. Yet as 
Bolleyer’s and Börzel’s analysis shows, we find a different pattern: member states were 
reluctant to undermine the legal coherence of the EU, which protected multilateral modes of 
day-to-day coordination (H1) and prevented a move towards a more asymmetrical allocation 
of competencies (H2). While the progressive deepening and widening of the EU has 
exacerbated the conflict between the majority of member states supporting further integration 
and more ‘reluctant’ Europeans (e.g. the UK, Denmark or the Czech Republic), forms of 
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differentiated integration have remained the exception and are mostly temporary as the 
reluctant usage of opt-outs indicates. This reveals interesting parallels to Auel’s assessment 
of German federalism. After five (relatively poor) new governments had joined Germany 
following Unification, the disparity between territorial interests became more pronounced 
and made horizontal coordination much more difficult – as the case in the EU after 
successive rounds of enlargement - but the constitutional imprint of the system provided a 
strong barrier against breaking with the basic logic of the system, despite major reform 
attempts.  
In essence, while the picture is more mixed than theoretically expected, we find party-
political incongruence to feed into IGR more forcefully in the context of federal systems than 
in regionalized ones. This final conclusion is again echoed by studies on systems not covered 
in this special issue. Both in Australia and in Belgium – two federal systems - IGR are more 
adversial in periods of party-political incongruence across units and levels (Swenden, 2002; 
Deschouwer, 2009; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009; Galligan, 1995; Painter 1998). In India, in 
contrast, conflict can be resolved unilaterally by the use of federal emergency powers, in 
particular, President’s Rule which gives then central government the power to overtake a 
state government, a clear expression of a central-regional hierarchy (Dua 1981). In recent 
decades, coalition government at the Indian centre and Supreme Court interference have 
contributed to a much less frequent use of these Emergency Powers, paving the way for a 
much stronger effect of party incongruence on IGR (Sáez 2002; Sathe 2002). 
 
The Role of Party (In)Congruence in Intergovernmental Relations 
 
Moving to the third and last hypothesis, the federal category was expected to contain those 
cases in which party (in)congruence has the most pronounced effect on IGR while 
intergovernmental disagreement is expected to be downplayed in regionalized and 
confederate systems because of the weaker position of the regional and confederal levels 
respectively. Compared with HI1 and H2 the results are more mixed, since neither 
Finland/Åland nor the EU meet the necessary pre-conditions for (in)congruence to have an 
effect on IGR, given the bifurcated nature of their party systems. Party incongruence is not 
applicable in the context of a bifurcated party system because it presupposes linkages 
between parties that operate in a multi-level system through a shared frame of reference 
regarding the nature of conflict and the issue dimensions along which competition between 
parties evolves not only within individual arenas but also across them. In other words it 
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presupposes the presence of at least some polity-wide or ‘state-wide’ parties. Both Hepburn 
as well as Bolleyer and Börzel stressed a disconnect between parties operating in different 
units or levels of these multi-level systems, which prevents the meaningful application of the 
concept. 
 Furthermore, according to Füglister and Wasserfallen, party congruence has a 
relatively weak integrative effect as compared to inter-party cooperation (consociationalism). 
In Switzerland oversized governments on the cantonal and federal level generate permanent 
congruence, which means – as theoretically expected – partisan conflict is of limited 
relevance. At the same time, however, the positive, integrative effect of intra-party linkages 
(i.e. of linkages between the same parties operating simultaneously in different government 
units) is less relevant than the fact that inter-party cooperation is encouraged by the presence 
of the direct-democratic mechanism of the facultative referendum which incentivizes the 
formation of oversized governments in the first place (Neidhart, 1970). Naturally, intra- and 
inter-party cooperation are necessarily closely interwoven in systems that are governed by 
multi-party coalitions composed of similar sets of parties, since a basic level of intra-party 
coherence is a preconditions for inter-party cooperation.v Yet Füglister and Wasserfallen 
indicate in their contribution that communication channels and linkage across arenas is not 
predominantly provided by ideological and organizational loyalty generated by the belonging 
to the same party operating across different arenas but by the institutionally induced culture 
of forming oversized governments in the cantonal and federal arenas. While this finding does 
not contradict our theoretical expectations, it provides a more nuanced picture of the role of 
party linkages. 
Moving to the patterns displayed by the four remaining countries, is party incongruence a less 
disruptive force in the two regionalized arrangements Italy and the UK than it is in the two 
federal arrangements Spain and Germany as hypothesized initially? 
As Swenden and McEwen’s analysis of the UK illustrated, party-political incongruence is a 
rather recent phenomenon and became a more widespread feature of devolution, only since 
the devolved elections of 2007, and especially since the Westminster general election of 2010 
which generated full incongruence in the composition of multi-level governments across the 
UK (see also McEwen et al, 2012). Before this period, IGR was overall co-operative, 
facilitated by the prevalence of the Labour Party in government across mainland Britain from 
1999-2007. Whether in the Westminster or the devolved arenas, the Labour Party broadly 
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shared policy and political agendas, minimising the likelihood of conflict emerging. Personal 
links and friendships further helped to ensure mutual trust, and facilitated inter-ministerial 
negotiation and compromise when necessary, thus echoing the importance of intra-party 
channels for linking governments in times of congruence. While any conclusions on the 
impact of the shift towards more incongruence in the UK multi-level system has to be 
preliminary, the UK case suggests that the effect of party-political incongruence on the 
dynamics of IGR has remained limited, also (albeit not exclusively) as a result of the UK’s 
non-federal setting. Pragmatic IGR have prevailed even when devolved self-rule is exercised 
solely by a nationalist party which seeks independence from the UK, as has been the case for 
Scotland since 2007. Intergovernmental agreement between the UK and the Scottish 
governments could even be reached on the process of organizing a referendum on Scottish 
Independence in September 2014, notwithstanding the diametrically opposed stance of the 
parties in the UK and Scottish governments on the issue. That said, both the Welsh and the 
Scottish government became more assertive in their interaction with the UK government post 
2007. Yet rather than leading to more conflict, the mode of IGR became moderately more 
institutionalised, with more use of formal multilateral fora, although bilateralism has 
remained the dominant mode. 
 Similar to the UK, party incongruence has had a limited effect on IGR in the Italian 
regionalized state. As we have seen earlier, in Italian IGR, the central government still has the 
last word. While this reduces the assertiveness with which lower-level governments fight for 
their party-political positions when in conflict with the central government, it does not render 
party politics irrelevant to intergovernmental dynamics. Presidents of regional governments 
that have been governed by the same coalition for a longer period have more often unified to 
protest against central governments governed by a rivaling party coalition. In a similar vein, 
and reminiscent of the Spanish case where constitutional litigation was used strategically by 
Autonomous Communities against the centre, all important cases of intergovernmental 
constitutional litigation were initiated by regions governed by the Communist Party, opposing 
the national government. At the same time, territorial interests can trump partisan affiliation 
in IGR. In a concerted effort to consolidate their regional legislative powers and curtail 
‘unfunded mandates’ imposed upon them by the centre, regional presidents (and 
governments) have occasionally formed a cross-partisan front, cross-cutting the ‘government-
opposition divide’ at the centre. Reinforcing the limited impact of vertical incongruence, 
congruence across levels tended to be restored relatively quickly, weakening the potential for 
a party-politically driven counter-mobilization of regions against the central government and 
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its policies. As Palermo and Wilson report, centre-left defeat on the regional level in 2000 
was followed by centre-left defeat on the national level a year later, while centre-right defeat 
in 2005 was followed by centre-right defeat in the centre in 2006.  
In essence, as in the assessment of H1 and H2, we again find parallels between Italy and the 
UK in line with our theoretical expectations. Comparing in the following the role of party-
political incongruence in the two federal systems Spain and Germany further substantiates 
our ‘comparative federalism perspective’, since in these two settings party-political 
incongruence has been considerably more disruptive than in the UK and Italy.  
Starting with the Spanish federal system, since transition in the late 1970s, we found regular 
periods of considerable incongruence, which fed strongly into intergovernmental dynamics. 
Incongruence has frequently been considerable. The party composition of regional 
governments has been dominated in the last decade, similarly to the national level, by the 
three main state-wide parties – Socialist Party (PSOE), the People’s Party (PP), and United 
Left (IU)– and by several regional, AC-based or non-state-wide parties. Several non-state 
wide parties had a pivotal position on the national level as majority provider for national 
minority governments, while on the regional level non state-wide parties are in parliament or 
cabinets in all but three regions. In Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre and the 
Canary Islands they have given rise to distinct regional party systems. Vertical incongruence 
has had a major impact on the nature of IGR. Aja and Colino’s contribution points at the 
party political motives underpinning a large number of jurisdictional conflicts lodged before 
the Spanish Constitutional Court by the central government or by the regional governments 
between 1983 and 2010. A majority of these came from three or four ACs that are usually 
ruled by one regional nationalist party or by the party in central opposition. Furthermore, and 
this resembles the dynamics we find in German federalism, party confrontation in IGR has 
been particularly visible when the main opposition party at the centre governs the large ACs. 
This dynamics emerged in recent times (2004-2011), when the Popular Party was in 
opposition at the central level and used intergovernmental bodies to impede or block the 
implementation of central policies in significant areas, such as long-term care programs for 
electoral reasons. Similar tendencies of regional government in partisan opposition to the 
central government party appeared in intergovernmental bodies in charge of fiscal 
consolidation efforts. While in Europeanized areas there are external pressures on 
intergovernmental bodies to find a shared solution, in domestic areas this strategizing can 
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lead to coordination failure and deadlock. As expected by H3, party-political incongruence is 
one major element affecting IGR. 
 Similar dynamics are found in German federalism. Auel’s analysis showed that levels 
of congruence across governmental levels have changed significantly since the foundation of 
the German Republic, fundamentally shaping multi-level dynamics and the problem-solving 
capacity of the regime. Starting out with high levels of congruence in the early years, 
incongruence made its appearance when the first federal SPD-FDP coalition (1969–82) faced 
a hostile CDU majority in the Bundesrat. Since then, with the exception of the first half of 
Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship (1982 – 1990), party-political incongruence across 
governmental levels has been a constant feature of German politics. As a response to party-
political polarization and signalling their readiness to exploit strategic opportunities arising 
from their veto potential in the second chamber, since the 1970s Länder have started to 
convene in two sets of informal meetings according to the coalition majority . These informal 
gatherings of so-called ‘A-Länder’ (SPD-led) and ‘B-Länder’ (CDU- or CSU-led) serve to 
coordinate the party line prior to formal Bundesrat meetings. Vice versa, to avoid 
immobilism, the federal government started to revise draft legislation ‘in anticipation of 
bicameral deadlock’ and thereby managed to reduce the number of bills vetoed by the 
Bundesrat considerably. Unification had a major impact on the German party system. It led to 
the emergence of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, successor to the former GDR 
Unity Party SED), which first was considered a regional party of the East, but managed to 
establish itself as the Left Party also in the West after its merger with the West German 
WASGvi, a new left party, in 2007. Today, party competition in the East is basically tripolar 
between the CDU, SPD and the PDS/Left List, while in the West it moved towards ‘moderate 
pluralism’ with increasingly weakening CDU/CSU and SPD and three minor parties, the 
Greens, the FDP and the Left Party. While this increased complexity made congruence as 
such less likely, it does not necessarily increase conflict or confrontation. The asymmetry of 
the party system made party competition more fluid due to the large number of mixed 
coalitions at the subnational level, i.e. Länder are no longer easily grouped into government 
supporting and opposition groups, which considerably changes the party-political dynamics 
of IGR. A confrontation of two coherent Länder blocks has become less likely, especially 
since territorial conflicts gained importance and cut across partisan configurations as Auel’s 
analysis points out. 
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An Assessment of Rivaling Factors: Undermining or Complementing Constitutionally Driven 
Dynamics?  
While many of the cases analyzed broadly correspond to the theoretically expected patterns, 
realities are inevitably more complex and differentiated than implied by the categories 
confederal, federal and regional multi-level system. Table 2 has already presented 
information on alternative factors that a range of case studies identified as significant 
influences on IGR, which were not part of our theoretical framework: first, inter-party 
cooperation and patterns of coalition formation, including the strong presence of regionalist 
parties in lower-level governments, a factor closely tied to our factors of party-political 
(in)congruence, although not equivalent to it; second, the importance of territorial as 
compared to partisan interests including conflicts over the distribution of financial resources 
in the system and third, the nature of shared rule arrangements in the centre.vii Each of these 
factors cut across our three constitutional categories and impact on multi-level dynamics. 
However, they do not question the connection between our constitutional categories and their 
impact on our three dependent variables as laid out above. 
These three factors identified by several of our case studies echo important distinctions long 
introduced in the comparative federalism literature. First, the nature of party competition and 
coalition formation is shaped by societal lines of conflict alluding to the distinction between 
mono- and pluri-national systems, stressing the importance of the societal underpinning of 
multi-level systems that can be more or less conducive to the rise of regionalist or ethno-
territorial parties (Meguid, 2005; Keating 2001; Stepan et al 2011). Our framework does not 
discriminate between vertical incongruence involving different state-wide parties and 
incongruence involving the presence of one or several stateless nationalist or regionalist 
parties. Regional demands for more decision-making competencies or even independence 
could strain intergovernmental relations with the centre, in addition to conflicting ideological 
preferences with regard to non-territorial issues.  
Adopting a cross-national perspective though, the inclusion of the pluri-national UK does not 
distort the general observation that in terms of intergovernmental dynamics, the UK has more 
in common with Italy, a mono-national, much less heterogeneous system - than with pluri-
national federal systems like Spain (Moreno, 2000). This underscores the importance of basic 
constitutional distinctions shaping intergovernmental dynamics despite societal differences 
cross-cutting them. Even if the Scots opted for independence in the upcoming referendum, 
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the UK case still confirmed the basic ‘asymmetrical logic’ of the polity as far as it refers to 
the unequal treatment or position of lower-level governments since independence is the most 
extreme form of a lower-level unit exploiting its specific status and its special bargaining 
power to get a particular deal from the centre that is very different from any possible deal for 
Wales or Northern Ireland. At the same time, we must acknowledge that the Scottish situation 
deviates from the idea of central-regional hierarchy constitutive for a regionalized multi-level 
system as defined earlier, a hierarchy which more appropriately describes the relationship 
between Westminster and Wales, where devolution is more constrained.  
 
A second important distinction that cross-cuts our categorization and that is linked to the 
(relative) importance of territorial interests is the path-dependent effect of the type of state 
formation (Riker, 1964; Sbragia, 1993; Stepan, 1999; Ziblatt, 2006) on IGR. Are we dealing 
with a ‘holding together’ system in which lower-level governments have been gradually 
empowered starting out from an initially centralized state, such as the case in Spain, and Italy 
or are we considering a ‘joined-up’ or ‘coming together federation’, which results from the 
unification of formerly autonomous regional units? The coming together nature of the EU 
and Switzerland is clear but a similar dynamic underpins the Finnish/Åland arrangement, 
whose nature was shaped by the fact that the belonging of Åland to the Finnish rather than 
the Swedish state was highly contested and its eventual integration in the Finnish state no 
matter of course.viii The recognition of the UK as ‘pluri-national’ predates devolution and is 
reflected in the history of the UK as a ‘union-state’ rather than unitary state between 1707 
and 1999, in which Scotland in particular received special recognition.   
 While territorial interests are relevant to IGR in any multi-level system as our case 
studies illustrate, how a system has been formed is likely to influence the relative weight of 
territorially defined lines of conflict, which are dominant in the EU and Finland/Åland and 
clearly important in Switzerland, while party linkages are ineffective as a counterweight to 
fragmentation in the two former cases and relatively weak in the latter. Systemic dynamics 
are inevitably influenced by the nature of a multi-level system’s origin but again the question 
is whether this influence undermines the relevance of our constitutional distinctions. McKay 
(2001) – comparing the EU to a range of federal systems in terms of institutional evolution 
and partisan dynamics – came to the conclusion that the EU and Switzerland have the most in 
common since both multi-level arrangements had been created by formerly independent units 
and in the process sought to reconcile multi-national and multi-lingual lines of conflict. While 
the above case studies echo this, the comparison of the EU and Swiss dynamics to multi-
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national, regionalized systems such as the UK in this special issue also suggests that the 
tendency towards multilateralism and symmetry is linked to similarities in the constitutional 
framework, the strong position of lower-level governments (i.e. of EU member states and of 
cantons respectively). Strong multilateral intergovernmental machineries could be established 
despite the diversity of the societies and of lower-level governments which these multi-level 
systems had to integrate, not because of it. The constitutionally enshrined equality helped to 
create intergovernmental institutions that recognize this equality, even though they take a 
much more formalized form in the EU than in Switzerland, where – as in many federal 
systems – intergovernmental bodies have no statutory basis (Bolleyer and Börzel, 2010).   
 Returning to the question how important the origin of a federal system is for the 
latter’s internal dynamics, being formed by formerly independent units explains why lower-
level governments enjoy an equally protected status, since such assurance can be considered 
as a fundamental condition for joining such a new union. However, not all federal multi-level 
systems in which lower-level governments enjoy equal constitutional protection are 
necessarily ‘coming together’ systems. As Spain but also Belgium demonstrates, initially 
centralized states might develop into regionalized and then into federal ones, which 
eventually give lower-level units equal constitutional status. The Spanish case is particularly 
interesting here as a devolved system that started out from considerable asymmetry between 
Autonomous Communities and a strong tendency towards bilateralism. As Aja and Colino 
show in their analysis, in line with a successive process of reforms that led to the 
homogenization of regional institutions and an increasingly symmetrical competence 
allocation in line with other federal systems, the intergovernmental machinery shifted 
towards multilateralism as described earlier. 
At the same time, despite this remarkable adaptation, the lack of any institutionalized 
access to central law-making through a territorial second chamber, access enjoyed by the 
German Länder as well as the EU member states (Sbragia, 1993), is reminiscent of the 
Spanish system’s early status as a regionalized state, which brings us to the third factor 
stressed as important by our case studies that does not form part of our framework: the nature 
of shared-rule arrangements. Spain shares this characteristic that weakens the position of 
lower-level governments in a multi-level system with regionalized states such as the UK and 
Italy but also with the, in constitutional terms, federal Finland-Åland relationship. That this 
structural weakness did not stop the Spanish state from adopting increasingly ‘federal 
patterns’ in terms of intergovernmental multilateralism and competence symmetry 
substantiates our initial decision to consider shared rule arrangements as a factor that is 
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relevant for IGR but not constitutive for our constitutional classification (see Table 2, in the 
introduction).  
 
4. The Merits and Limitations of Constitutional Categories to Study Multi-level Systems  
While our constitutional categories are relatively abstract, the case studies suggest that they 
indeed systematically shape distinct lines of authority and hierarchy in multi-level systems. 
As we have seen in the comparative assessment of the findings, with the exception of the 
Finland/Åland federacy, all case study chapters found patterns in line with H1 and 2. Day-to-
day IGR and the nature of constitutional change in regionalized systems systematically differ 
from those in federal systems and confederations. The nature of the constitutional setting – 
more precisely the constitutional entrenchment of lower-level governments’ equal status in 
the multi-level system as a whole - showed an immediate impact on the structures created to 
respond to vertical and horizontal coordination demands in a multi-level system and 
constrained the way in which the constitutional setting is altered over time. While we found 
that societal characteristics (e.g. the pluri-national character of a country) complicate and to 
some extent alter multi-level dynamics as compared to homogeneous countries, it is telling 
that although we found pluri-national countries in the regionalized category (UK), the federal 
category (Spain) and the confederate category (EU), the constitutionally induced differences 
prevailed nonetheless. Consequently, the distinction between pluri- and mono-national 
countries does not question our approach of considering constitutionally generated dynamics 
as the main driver of intergovernmental dynamics. Nor can this distinction be seen as a 
determinant of the constitutional nature of the system as captured by our three categories (i.e. 
as societal precondition), since the distinction cuts across them. While multi-level systems 
formed by initially independent governments are likely to lead to the adoption of a 
constitutional framework protecting the equal status of these governments, this mode of 
formation is no necessary condition for the latter, as the Spanish case illustrated. Neither does 
the pluri-national nature of a society necessary lead to the adoption of such a setting as the 
case of the UK suggests. 
Moving on to H3, sources of intergovernmental conflict proved more complex than implied 
by our hypothesis stressing the importance of the presence or absence of a constitutional 
hierarchy between central and lower-level governments. While the dynamics in the UK and 
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Italy as regionalized systems and Spain and Germany as the federal cases showed differences 
in line with our expectations, three cases showed partially different patterns from those we 
expected. The substance of conflict is central to H3, and empirically, this is not only or 
predominantly shaped by party competition but also by societal divisions, which - as our case 
studies indicated - shape the relative weight of territorial conflict. The constitutional setting 
plays an important role in how strongly territorial interests feed into central decision-making, 
as Sbragia (1993) stressed in her seminal article comparing the EU to Germany in which she 
highlighted parallels between the Bundesrat and the Council of Ministers. Yet for party-
political incongruence to be able to play a dominant role and for territorial interests to have 
less weight in intergovernmental dynamics, parties need to share a frame of reference 
regarding the nature of conflict and the issue dimensions along which competition between 
them evolves horizontally and vertically. A fundamental disconnect between the inter-party 
competition that takes place within the individual arenas that constitute a multi-level setting 
as the case in Finland/Åland and the EU undermines the capacity of parties to become 
vertical and horizontal channels for conflict or structures of communication and cooperation.  
 
In sum, the cross-national analysis in this special issue suggested that by deriving 
expectations from abstract analytical distinctions about multi-level dynamics, we can more 
easily ‘cut across’ specificities that indeed exist for each case and identify similarities and 
differences more effectively. Hence, while individual cases – as Finland/Åland, the EU and to 
some extent the UK and Switzerland indicated - will inevitably only correspond to these 
expectations in part, we prefer this to a ‘sui generis’ approach that takes the uniqueness or the 
idiosyncrasies of a particular case – for instance, the dominance of direct-democratic 
mechanisms in the Swiss case - as its starting assumption. Doing so risks undermining cross-
national comparisons from the outset. Abstract, in our case constitutionally defined, 
categories helped to filter out genuinely ‘case-specific’ features. Sometimes these features 
constitute real idiosyncrasies and lead to patterns fundamentally different from other multi-
level systems. However, as the case studies in this special issue suggested, despite the 
diversity of the systems covered, these idiosyncrasies usually do not override those factors 
that shape multi-level dynamics in other systems as well.  
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i Usually, but not always, the constitutionally protected status of lower-level governments is linked to shared 
rule requirements, i.e. the extent to which sub-units can participate in central decision making, usually via a 
second chamber (Swenden 2004). Whether lower-level governments in federal arrangements also have a say 
about national law making naturally affects their overall strength towards the centre and therefore has 
implications for how clearly our hypotheses play out. However, we did not expect this feature to qualitatively 
alter the basic systemic logic captured by our categorization, which is why our classification does not refer to 
shared rule mechanisms as constitutive element. 
ii The JMC Europe was an exception to this rule. 
iii Only 3 of 26 cantons opposed it.  
iv Considerable administrative matters are decentralized to the local level though. 
v Cross-national studies that systematically place Swiss parties in the context of other federal systems, rather 
than engaging in a single-case study as presented in this special issue, indicate that party linkages are weaker in 
Switzerland (where in the cantons parliaments and executives are separately elected) than in parliamentary 
federal systems such as Germany or Canada, for instance. At the same time, once compared with the US as the 
other extreme where parties as organizations are institutionally undermined by open primaries for the selection 
of candidates, it becomes clear that intra-party linkage provide one precondition for bridging inter-institutional 
divides within government units and one underpinning for cooperative IGR between oversized, consociational 
governments (Thorlakson 2009; Bolleyer 2011). Looking at the nature of parties, Switzerland shares more 
similarities with consociational Belgium (although there the party system is bifurcated) than with the 
institutionally similarly fragmented US system, since at least until 2004 there has been a tendency for Socialists, 
Liberals and CD from across the Dutch- and French-speaking party systems to join in federal government or 
opposition due to ideological affinities (Swenden 2002; Deschouwer 2009). 
vi The Electoral Alternative for Employment and Social Justice (Wahlalternative für Arbeit und soziale 
Gerechtigkeit) was founded 2004. 
vii Factors identified by Table 2 that only concern individual cases such as the origin as international 
organisation in the case of the EU or direct democracy in Switzerland are not considered. 
viii Germany is difficult to classify. While it has a historical tradition of regional, administrative autonomy but 
the federal system created post-1945 can hardly described as ‘coming together’ federation. 
 
 
